China’s new tech champions stand at a crossroads
A monkey, a whale and a robot are reshaping China’s tech ambitions. Often dubbed the “Six Little Dragons,” a small group of tech startups clustered in Hangzhou is pushing the frontiers of gaming, artificial intelligence and robotics–and redefining what China’s next tech champions could look like.
From Black Myth: Wukong, a blockbuster game that has propelled Chinese storytelling onto the global stage, to DeepSeek’s meteoric rise in large language models from a once little-known Hangzhou lab, to a new generation of humanoid robots capable of sprinting, flipping and even performing martial arts, these breakthroughs all stem from a new cohort of innovators.
Their emergence signals more than a regional success story. It reflects a broader shift in China’s national priorities: away from consumer internet platforms and towards hard technology, with the aim of cementing the country’s position as a global tech leader.
Yet a central question remains. How does their status as private firms sit within a system that continues to prioritize state-led industrial strategy? And, perhaps more importantly, is China’s state-guided, locally financed innovation model able to produce globally competitive tech champions?
A new tech cluster takes shape
The so-called “Six Little Dragons” are six high-profile startups spanning artificial intelligence, robotics, neuroscience and spatial computing. Unlike earlier waves of Chinese tech giants that emerged from Beijing or Shenzhen, these firms have risen from Hangzhou–long known as the home of Alibaba Group but not traditionally seen as a deep-tech hub.
Their rise raises a natural question: what is it about Hangzhou that attracts such companies? Industry observers point to a combination of factors, including a strong digital economy foundation, proximity to top universities and a local government willing to back emerging technologies with funding, infrastructure and policy support.
Hangzhou’s startup ecosystem has been a key driver in its rise as an innovation hub, says Chen Li, a researcher with Anbound, an independent think tank based in Beijing.
“The city has built a strong concentration of companies and talent in the digital economy, artificial intelligence and internet sectors, creating a vibrant environment for entrepreneurship,” she says. “At the same time, continued improvements in government efficiency and end-to-end support–from idea incubation to business establishment–have fostered a more ‘founder-friendly’ ecosystem, which stands out as one of Hangzhou’s core advantages.”
Each of the six firms occupies a distinct niche.

DeepSeek, the youngest of the dragons, was founded in 2023 by Liang Wenfeng, and is developing large language models and foundational AI systems that rival leading Western counterparts, while operating at a fraction of the cost.
Game Science, set up by Feng Ji in 2014, has captured international attention with Black Myth: Wukong, a AAA title rooted in Chinese mythology that has achieved both commercial success and critical acclaim.
Unitree Robotics produces high-performance quadruped and humanoid robots known for their agility, affordability and rapid commercialization. With significantly lower prices compared to Western peers, its products have gone viral globally. It was established by Wang Xingxing in 2016.
Meanwhile, DEEP Robotics, the brainchild of Zhu Qi, was set up in 2017 and focuses on embodied intelligence platforms, integrating perception, control and mobility into deployable robotic systems, reflecting a broader shift from lab-based robotics research to scalable, industrial-grade applications, highlighting China’s strength in engineering-driven AI deployment.
BrainCo is advancing non-invasive brain–computer interface technologies, with applications spanning healthcare, education and human augmentation. Its products–ranging from prosthetic control systems to attention-monitoring devices–have already seen commercialization at scale, particularly in China’s education sector. It was founded by Han Bicheng in 2015.
Manycore Tech is the oldest of the dragons, founded back in 2011 by Huang Xiaohuang. It is working on spatial intelligence and 3D AI, building tools that enable machines to understand and generate three-dimensional environments. The company passed its listing hearing for the Hong Kong stock exchange on March 29, 2026, putting it one step away from going public. It is widely expected to become the world’s first listed “spatial intelligence” firm and could be the first among Hangzhou’s “Six Little Dragons” to complete an IPO–marking a milestone for the cohort.
Their emergence follows a broader shift as Beijing tightened regulation on consumer internet platforms and redirected policy support toward semiconductors, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing. In that sense, the “dragons” are as much a product of policy recalibration as they are of entrepreneurial ambition.
Their convergence in Hangzhou is also “a reflection of the powerful spillover effects of Alibaba’s ecosystem,” says Xu Tianchen, senior economist at the Economist Intelligence Unit.
“Many of the founding teams of these ‘Six Little Dragons’ emerged directly from the Alibaba orbit, inheriting its strengths in data capabilities, engineering culture and commercialization mindset,” he adds.
A different model from Silicon Valley
Compared with Silicon Valley, the ecosystem shaping these companies is markedly different.
In the United States, startups are typically born in a venture capital-driven environment, where rapid scaling and global market access are key priorities from day one. The government plays a relatively indirect role, often limited to regulation or research funding.
By contrast, China’s new wave of tech startups operates in closer proximity to the state. While the “Six Little Dragons” are private enterprises, they engage with the government as an active partner–benefiting from subsidies, procurement opportunities and policy alignment, which “could ease the financing pressure,” Xu notes.
“You could argue that it complicates corporate governance, but it also fast-tracks companies’ success,” he says.
This relationship also shapes their approach to globalization. Silicon Valley firms often expand internationally early, leveraging open markets and established networks. Chinese startups, while increasingly ambitious, face a more complex landscape marked by export controls, geopolitical tensions and regulatory scrutiny abroad.
Anbound’s Chen adds that while the two share similarities in innovation-driven growth and high expectations for scalability, they differ markedly in institutional context, market orientation and how their ecosystems take shape.
“The startup environment in which the ‘Six Little Dragons’ operate is anchored by a vast domestic market and strong policy support, which in some ways leads to greater policy dependence and faster, more cyclical competition,” she says.
“From an international perspective, Silicon Valley startups tend to integrate into global capital and market networks at an earlier stage, with a more inherently global outlook, whereas the ‘Six Little Dragons’ often begin by validating technologies and business models within the domestic market before gradually expanding overseas.”
Policy, capital and momentum
Much of the momentum behind these companies stems from their alignment with national priorities. China’s leadership has repeatedly emphasized the importance of technological self-sufficiency and innovation-driven growth, embedding these goals in successive Five-Year Plans.
China sets the direction at the top, and local governments make it happen on the ground—this has been key to the rise of the “Six Little Dragons”, according to Chen.
At the local level, governments have played a crucial role in nurturing the ecosystem.
Hangzhou’s advantage has been built over decades of policy consistency and ecosystem cultivation. The city designated the digital economy as its “No.1 project” early on and sustained that focus, with the sector’s core industries accounting for nearly 29% of GDP by 2024–laying a strong industrial foundation for companies operating at the technological frontier, including AI and robotics. At the same time, local authorities have supported firm growth through policy-backed and industrial fund clusters exceeding hundreds of billions of yuan, investing heavily in strategic emerging industries and backing several of the “Six Little Dragons.”
“These funds leverage government guidance to crowd in private capital, effectively filling the gap left by the market in early-stage deep tech investment, and in doing so have significantly shaped the growth trajectory of these companies,” says Chen.
From a strategic perspective, the combined effect of national and local policies has guided the “Six Little Dragons” toward priority sectors aligned with state objectives, Chen adds.
Fields such as large language models, robotics and brain-computer interfaces are all explicitly supported as part of China’s “new infrastructure” and strategic emerging industries, providing a clear policy framework for firms’ technology choices and long-term R&D planning. At the same time, Chen adds, preferential access to resources–ranging from talent and capital to industrial coordination has created a supportive external environment, giving these companies more stable development expectations.
In addition, China’s vast internet user base and unified domestic market provide abundant use cases, massive data and rapid paths to commercialization, allowing the “Six Little Dragons” to quickly test, refine and scale their products.
Capital has followed policy signals. Investors–both public and private–have increasingly channeled funds into sectors such as AI, robotics and advanced manufacturing, favoring companies that align with strategic goals. As a result, growth for these firms depends less on user acquisition, as was the case for earlier internet platforms, and more on demonstrable technological breakthroughs.
Structural challenges ahead
Despite their rapid rise and technological breakthroughs, most of the “Six Little Dragons” are not turning consistent profit. With the exception of Game Science, whose flagship Black Myth:Wukong has generated substantial returns—an estimated $1 billion in revenue in the first 100 days of launch—the majority of the companies remain in the growth phase, and are prioritizing research and development. This raises the question of whether these firms will be able to transition from policy-backed innovation to self-sustaining commercial successes.
Taken together, the “Six Little Dragons” are emerging as globally competitive players, with capabilities that increasingly rival leading international peers. Yet their rise is unfolding against a more constrained external environment, shaped by export controls, restricted access to advanced chips and growing geopolitical scrutiny–forces that both challenge their expansion and are likely to shape the next phase of their evolution.
Technology decoupling between China and the United States has restricted access to cutting-edge semiconductors and tools, raising costs and slowing development cycles. At the same time, geopolitical tensions have increased scrutiny of Chinese tech firms abroad, complicating efforts to expand into overseas markets.
Geopolitical tensions and tightening technology restrictions are emerging as a structural constraint on the next generation of Chinese tech firms, shaping both their global expansion and pace of innovation, Chen says.
“Export controls on advanced chips and high-end manufacturing equipment are creating bottlenecks in computing power, which could slow down large model training and the deployment of AI services at scale,” she adds.
“These restrictions are also reshaping the rules of global competition–raising compliance costs, complicating cross-border collaboration, and forcing companies to redesign their international strategies to navigate increasing regulatory and national security scrutiny.”
Policy dependence is another double-edged sword. Close alignment with national strategy brings funding and support, but it can also limit flexibility. Companies may find themselves prioritizing policy objectives over commercial considerations, potentially constraining innovation.
There is also the risk of volatility. Should policy priorities shift, funding and support could quickly be redirected, leaving firms exposed.
But market-oriented companies face their own risks, as any form of dependence cuts both ways, says Peng Peng, executive chairman of the Guangdong Society of Reform, a think tank affiliated with the provincial government.
“The challenge of balancing between the market and the state is no longer unique to Chinese companies–it is now also a dilemma for US firms, including the ‘Magnificent Seven’,” says Peng. “In China, companies must both leverage government guidance, such as the Five-Year Plan, and respond to market forces and opportunities, crafting long-term strategies that navigate both, while continuously sustaining their capacity for technological innovation.”
Between national champions and global contenders
Ultimately, whether these companies can become true global contenders on a par with Silicon Valley will depend on how effectively they navigate the balance between state support and market forces, while sustaining their capacity for independent innovation in an increasingly constrained global environment, observers say.
On the one hand, strong government backing has enabled rapid progress, providing resources and direction in a competitive global landscape. On the other, it also means that many of these companies have yet to prove they can generate sustainable profits. Moreover, less autonomy could stifle their ability to adapt, particularly in fast-moving sectors where agility is critical.
“Navigating international markets means dealing with complex external factors–from technical standards and global rules to geopolitical risk–which requires a high degree of flexibility,” says Chen. “But overall, companies like the ‘Six Little Dragons’ are steadily building strength in the domestic market and are beginning to translate that momentum into growing competitiveness and influence in selected global markets.”