As history makes clear, a powerful China is not expansionist

Beneath the “China threat” thesis, often heard in Western policy circles, is the assumption that China will become expansionist as it grows more powerful.

But history gives us little reason to treat that as inevitable. At moments of peak strength, China has not consistently converted power into the kind of overseas colonialism, expansionism or conquest that marked the ascent of Western great powers.

There are three often-cited reasons to suggest China’s rise might lead to expansionism.

First, some assume that when China becomes “No 1”, surpassing Western powers in gross domestic product, technological prowess or military strength, it will develop expansionist tendencies. This assumption is immediately challenged by the centuries in which China was the world’s pre-eminent power. During the Song dynasty (960–1279), China’s economic and technological sophistication far exceeded that of contemporary Europe, yet that dominance did not lead to territorial expansion.

This historical pre-eminence is underscored by modern scholars. Nobel laureate Joel Mokyr and his co-authors Avner Greif and Guido Tabellini stress in Two Paths to Prosperity that 11th century China possessed levels of administrative capacity and commercialisation unmatched in Europe.

As they write, the Song dynasty governed “a large and powerful empire that consisted of about 20 million households, a capital city of 750,000 inhabitants, and an army estimated to exceed a million soldiers, and had a tax revenue approaching a tenth of total output and four or five times that collected by the Roman Empire at its peak”. Despite these massive resources, the Song did not seek to colonise distant lands.

Or consider the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). China was the global leader in nearly every category of power, producing more than a third of global GDP, and fielding the world’s greatest military. China led innovation in fields from advanced shipbuilding to multicolour woodblock printing. Yet, China largely used its might to advance trade and connectivity, not conquest.

Between 1405 and 1433, Admiral Zheng He led seven massive treasure-fleet expeditions that reached the Arabian Peninsula and Swahili coast. These fleets carried goods and envoys, deliberately avoiding territorial claims. By contrast, the 15th century saw rising European powers like Portugal begin a wave of global conquest where taking territory was the primary objective. The Ming voyages, however, focused on establishing prestige and securing maritime trade routes.

Even though overseas Chinese populations spread across Southeast Asia, China did not attempt to annex the states. Malaysia’s former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad bluntly stated that the Chinese “do not colonise”, unlike European powers, despite being a powerful neighbour for thousands of years. “So we have lived with China all these years and we have to accept that China is a powerful nation,” he noted in an interview last year.

Today, China is the world’s second-largest economy, fields the world’s largest standing army and possesses cutting-edge scientific power in many fields. But looking back at when China was No 1 in every category, this power did not lead to territorial expansion or colonisation.

The second reason cited is that because China is not a liberal democracy, its re-emergence as the superpower may lead to expansionism.

But China has never been a liberal democracy and its periods of greatest power during the Song and Ming dynasties coincided with highly centralised, non-liberal systems that did not pursue territorial growth. Historically, centralised authority in China has served as a tool for internal governance and stability rather than a vehicle for expansion.

While China possesses extensive borders today, much of this territory was annexed during non-Han rule, specifically the Mongol Yuan (1271–1368) and Manchu Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. In contrast, Han rule, representing the vast majority of China’s population and cultural mainstream, has been marked by internal consolidation. Throughout 5,000 years, the Chinese people have fought civil wars and seen dynasties collapse, but major territorial expansion occurred mainly under ethnic-minority rule.

A third reason raised in the West is that the concentration of power in China’s current leadership could increase the risk of expansionism. Yet this fear dissolves under historical analysis.

No matter how much authority lies with modern Chinese leaders, it pales in comparison to that of the Ming or Song emperors, who exercised near-absolute authority through an extraordinarily bureaucratised civil service system. That centralised power did not propel China outward; instead, it maintained stable control over an already vast territory.

The nature of China’s power was perhaps best summarised half a century ago by then US national security adviser Henry Kissinger. Speaking to Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, Kissinger noted: “A strong China is not expansionist because this is your tradition.”

In On China, Kissinger observed a consistency in Chinese statecraft that emphasises harmony and order over territorial overreach. Reflecting on the Ming voyages, he wrote: “Yet beyond declaring China’s greatness and issuing invitations to portentous ritual, Zheng He displayed no territorial ambition. He brought back only gifts, or ‘tribute’; he claimed no colonies or resources for China beyond the metaphysical bounty of extending the limits of All Under Heaven.”

This long-standing assessment continues to surface in contemporary analysis. Veteran US diplomat Chas W. Freeman recently noted that “China does not seek to conquer or abridge the sovereignty of its neighbours. It is not engaged in a search for Lebensraum or foreign colonies. It has no theory of ‘manifest destiny’.”

The historical record suggests a clear pattern: when China has reached peak strength, it has not consistently turned that power into overseas colonisation, territorial conquest or an expansionist project of the kind that often accompanied Western pre-eminence.

Sources:

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• Dreyer, Edward L. Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405 – 1433. The Library of World Biography. Pearson Longman, 2010.
• Freeman, Chas. Ceding the Future to China – Remarks to Brown University’s Watson School’s “China Chat.” December 2, 2025. https://chasfreeman.net/ceding-the-future-to-china/.
• Greif, Avner, Joel Mokyr, and Guido Enrico Tabellini. Two Paths to Prosperity: Culture and Institutions in Europe and China, 1000-2000. Princeton University Press, 2025.
• Husain, Mishal. “Mahathir Mohamad: Trump Is ‘Against the Whole World.’” Bloomberg, July 10, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2025-mahathir-bin-mohamad-weekend-interview/.
• Kissinger, Henry. On China. Penguin Press, 2011.
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